Notes TASK May 25 2011

Exfiltration

• attackers don't user the front door.
• Wholesale v retail
  • we have seen wholesale attacks that affect common components.
  • in the retail world we attack those things that are specific to the target.
  • "one shot one kill"

• the long game
• need email address.
• predictable email addresses.
• PTO news later , getting
  • multigo - intel gathering
  • linked in google hacks
• inference attack,
  • troop movements are an exmaple
• http://samy.pl/peepmail/
• profile the company and build a scenario
  • 10k filings
  • mergers and aquisitions
  • defence contractors
  • corp fileing, news, layoff
• Fedex and UPS doesn't validate sedner address
• register tuns of variations of your domain to protect against others registering variations
• The speaker explained a scenario where he send training cds to staff that took over their computer. As part of the atttack he registered a variation of the targets company's name to gain validity in the eyes of the users.
  • DT to what end? are you just scaring peple ? is it possible to protect ?
  • DT are you tring to create twitching balls of anxiety?
  • DT how can a company possibly protect against this?

• payload contruction
  • microsoft signed applet.
  • site loader , valid cert , valid domain, user clicks ok.
• annoucing the hiring of a new exec
• homographic attacks
• utf8 domains
• idn register with duplicate S in cyrillic.
• multifactor foils this a bit, slows this down,
• not all sigs get distributed in the GA data releaase.
• pescrambler can be used to create exes that are hard to "understand", this works in the spear phishing scenario as there is no widespread knowledge of the behaviors.

C&C

• listening on 443
• some IPS can detect suspected traffic
• you can use ie to handle the out bound connection for you.
• exfiltration:
  • DNS DNS2tcp nstx , iodine
  • simple to detect , difficult to deter.
  • the best defence is dns whileisting.
• cyber pompeii
  • no scanning
  • no escalating
  • password reuse.,
  • serivce accounts
  • general pilfering
• gather data.
  • antivirus service account are great targets.
  • targets are patent pipeline, sourc econtrol

• now what?
  • perimeters in perimeters
  • strong open processes
  • so more than any security product.
• internal red teams, DIY,
  • jericho initiative ??

• phish your own users and clients

• how do you protect against invading the wrong people's privacy
  • policy: "wont' targets machines you don't own"

• data destruction policy

Second talk: Palo Alto Networks

• silver creeek
• fireeye
• bit9

"What happens if the hacker is "INSIDE?"

NAC - network access control system

no antivirus
no mac auth
site protector
 inbound / outbound examined , stops attacks .
ncase servlet for forensic examination
Blackice ibm tool
Proventia Desktop

Running version: winsows XP 5.1.2600j BNS

Hacking Android

• tl;dr: android is a jvm on a linux machine